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RECENT CASE C0OMMThENTS
CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENSES - ENTRAPMENT. - SorreZUs v.
United States' is the first direct decision of the United States Su-
preme Court on the validity of the defense of entrapment.' The
defendant, after several requests by a disguised federal prohibi-
tion agent who had come to his home for the purpose, procured
liquor and sold it to the agent, induced partially perhaps by the
friendly conversation the two had got into meanwhile about mu-
tual war experiences. Defendant was convicted of violation of
the National Prohibition Act,' the trial court refusing to submit
the issue of entrapment to the jury, ruling as a matter of law
that there was no entrapment. The circuit court of appeals af-
firmed the judgment, but the Supreme Court, on a writ of cer-
tiorari limited to the question whether the evidence was sufficient
to go to the jury on the issue of entrapment, reversed. The
Court stated that if the jury should find entrapment to have been
present, defendant would not be guilty of violation of the stat-
ute, as it was not intended to apply to innocent persons who have
been trapped into the commission of acts prohibited under it.'
The use of the entrapment defense has increased greatly
since the enactment of narcotic and intoxicating liquor statutes.'
The earlier use of the defense was confined to cases where, as a
result of inducement, the accused appears to have committed a
crime which he did not intend to commit,' or where, by reason
153 S. Ct. 210 (1932).
2 The opinion states that the Court has never before spoken on the precise
question. Supra n. 1, at 213. In Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 48
S. Ct. 373 (1928), the objection of entrapment was not taken either below
or in the Supreme Court, and the Court said that it did not feel at liberty
to raise the defense of its own motion. In the nearest analogous situation
that has reached the Supreme Court, it held that the illegal method of "wire-
tapping" used by the government officials to obtain evidence of prohibition
violations did not render the evidence inadmissible, and that convictions
obtained therewith should be affirmed. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438, 48 S. Ct. 564 (1928).
'27 U. S. C. A. § 12 (1926).
'The Circuit Court of Appeals decision is discussed in (1932) 17 MINN.
L. REv. 90, and Supreme Court's decision in (1933) 17 MuiN. L. REv. 331.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit, speaking through L.
Hand, J., has construed the Sorrells decision not to apply to habitual of-
fenders. United States v. Becker, 62 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
Query: May a court treat as an habitual offender one who has not before
been convicted of the crime?
"See United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214, 216 (D. Conn., 1923) ; Notes
(1929) 2 So. CA~i. L. REV. 283, 284; (1930) 44 HAnv. L. REV. 109; (1921)
18 A. L. R. 146; (1930) 66 A. L. R. 478, 488.
a United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (D. C., 1913) ; Voves v. United States,
249 F. 191 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
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of the consent implied in the inducement, no crime has in fact
been committed." In these cases the defense is valid for there is
no operative criminal intent."
The Supreme Court in the Sorrells case,' however, attempts
to extend the field of application of the defense much farther.
The reasoning is that in any case where the enforcing officer has
himself been guilty of a violation of the law which induced the
violation of the accused, that the mere fact of the officer's guilt
is an exoneration for the accused. This result is based on the
so-called "public policy" ground that the government must set
a law-abiding example for its citizens and thus preserve the "pur-
ity of its own temple"; '° - the government cannot take ad-
vantage of the wrong of its agents in order to convict the crim-
inals they have illegally detected.' The government must, of
course, set the example for law observance by the honest admin-
istration of justice. But does the Supreme Court's decision,
which allows both violators? to go free, further that policy? Two
wrongs do not make a right - neither does one crime justify
another. The only way in which the government can fully vin-
dicate itself is to punish both offenders. Assuming that the pros-
ecutor will be reluctant to seek the conviction of a fellow officer,
that obstacle does not justify the Court's lenient position in al-
lowing both criminals to go scot-free.
"People v. MeCord, 76 Mich. 200, 42 N. W. 1106 (1889); Connor v. People,
18 Colo. 373, 33 Pac. 159, 25 L. R. A. 341 (1893); People v. Clough, 59 Cal.
43 (1881); Williams v. State, 55 Ga. 391, 1 Am. Cr. Rep. 413 (1875).
8 See notes in (1887) 81 Am. Dec. 365-367; (1887) 91 Am. Dec. 482; (1877)
30 Am. Rep. 129; (1922) 18 A. L. R. 149; (1924) 10 VA. L. REV. 316.
The distinction is made as to in which mind the intent to commit the crime
originated. If the intent had its origin in the officer's mind and he lured an
innocent person into committing the crime, the victim of the plot should not
be prosecuted. Driskill v. United States, 24 P. (2d) 525 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928);
Peterson v. United States, 255 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919); Capuano v.
United States, 9 P. (2d) 41 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925); Voves v. United States,
supra n. 6. See also Note (1930) 43 Hsnv. L. REv. 617. The theory is that
the government is estopped to prosecute the violator in such a case. O'Brien
v. United States, 51 P. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); discussed in (1931)
45 HARv. L. REv. 381.
9° upra n. 1.
20 For a strong argument in favor of public policy in this direction, see the
vigorous dissenting opinions of Air. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Olmstead v. United States, supra n. 2 at 469; and of Mr. Justice Brandeis
in Casey v. United States, 223 Ped. 412 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915).
" See the language of the Court in the opinion, supra n. 1, at 214.
"2The officer has, of course, in every case at least technically committed the
crime also, as he had the intent to commit it although his motive in doing so
may have been good. There are many cases, moreover, in which he undoubtedly
cannot even plead the worthy motive, since he has deliberately instigated the
2
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The Court emphatically declares that its holding rests on a
"fundamental rule of public policy."'3 One may suggest that
that much overworked phrase is simply judicial rationalization.
In the instant case is it not equally conceivable that the public
should consider the policy of government-purity completely over-
shadowed by a policy of rigid law enforcement which will guar-
antee to prospective violators swift detection and certain punish-
ment? Particularly in the liquor cases the courts have been re-
luctant to allow the defense of entrapment"' because of the great
difficulty of detecting violations in this field in any other way.'
But without deciding whether a distinction should be made for
this particular class of case, the general rule of the majority of
state courts," including West Virginia,' is contrary to that enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in the Sorrells case.' The state
courts' view is that "a person making an unlawful sale of liquor
is not excused from criminality by the fact that the sale is in-
duced for the express purpose of prosecuting the seller"."
It is submitted that the Supreme Court's statement "consid-
erations of mere convenience must yield to the essential demands
of justice".. is at least questionable. "Justice" is as indefinite
a basis for decision as is "public policy". Too frequently "jus-
tice" means mere leniency toward law violators. The community
has a claim for "justice" as well as the individual. This seems
particularly so in the light of the prevailing opinion that in the
majority of eases it is the chronic offender that is finally caught
in the government traps.' A court should exercise caution in
enunciating a rule which exceeds the sanction of popular belief
crime in order to build up his record of detections and consequently increase
his financial remuneration.
"See supra n. 11.
"See State v. Broaddus, 315 Mo. 1279, 1285, 289 S. W. 792, 795, (1926);
1 BIsHoP CniminAL Lw (9th ed. 1923) § 926 et 6eq.; of. State v. Driscoll,
119 Kan. 473, 239 Pac. 1105, 1106 (1925); De Graff v. State, 2 Okla. Cr.
519, 552, 103 Pac. 538, 550 (1909).
"See State v. Driscoll; De Graff v. State, both supra n. 14; BIsHoP, Zoo.
cit. supra n. 14.
"0 See Note (1921) 18 A. L. R. 146.
"See State v. Piscioneri, 68 W. Va. 76, 69 S. E. 375 (1910) ; State v. Jarvis,
105 W. Va. 499, 143 S. E. 235 (1928); State v. Hamrick, 163 S. E. 868 (W.
Va., 1932), especially at 870: "'Where the only inducement offered by an
officer to promote a sale of liquor is willingness to buy, the doctrine of entrap-
ment is not abailable to the seller."
2Supra n. 1.
10 Supra n. 16, quoted in State v. .arvis, supra n. 17, 105 W. Va. at 502;
State v. Hamrick, supra n. 17, at 871.
0Sorrells v. United States, supra n. 1, at 216.
"See Note (1929) 2 So. CAin'. L. REv. 283, at 292 and 293.
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concerning proper individual conduct.' Unfortunately there are
no statistics available to verify that opinion; and until there is
more definite information on the practical results of entrapment
methods courts should proceed slowly in changing the existing
rules of law.
-Tnixy M. PETERS.
CRIMINAL LAW - EFFECT oF AGREEMNENT TO PLEAD GUILTY IN
CONSIDERATION OF PROMISE TO DROP OTmE CHARGES. - The de-
fendant was indicted for violation of the banking laws. He plead
that the charges were identical with those alleged in one of thirteen
indictments previously returned against him, on which occasion
the prosecuting attorney had agreed, with the court's approval, to
discharge the defendant from further prosecution under these
thirteen indictments if he would plead guilty to the fourteenth in-
dictment, and assist in liquidating the bank's accounts; that the
defendant had performed his part of the agreement; that the entries
of nolle prosequi were made under the other indictments; and that
he had served a prison sentence following conviction under the
remaining indictment. A demurrer to this plea was sustained and
its sufficiency certified. Held, that the plea was a bar. State v.
Ward.
This decision is squarely in conflict with the rule adopted by
most courts to the effect that such agreements create merely an
"equitable right" to a pardon, which the courts will recommend
but cannot effect.! The court has in effect assumed the power to
pardon, which is expressly reserved to the governor alone by the
West Virginia Constitution.' A nolle prosequi in itself is no bar
to a subsequent prosecution.' The entry of a nolle prosequi could
=The words of Mr. Justice Holmes to this effect are famous: I I Tradition
and the habits of the community count for more than logic." Laurel Hill
Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, 30 S. Ct. 301
(1910).
1165 S. E. 803 (W. Va., 1932).
2Whiskey Cases, 99 U. S. 594, 24 S. Ct. 399 (1878); State v. Kiewel,
166 Minn. 302, 207 N. W. 646 (1926); State v. Keep, 85 Ore. 265, 166 Pae.
936 (1917); People v. Groves, 63 Cal. App. 709, 219 Pac. 1033 (1923). See
Note (1910) 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 439.
s W. Va. Const., Art. 7, § 11.
'State v. Crawford, 83 W. Va. 556, 98 S. E. 615 (1919); Eastham v.
Holt, 43 W. Va. 599, 27 S. E. 883 (1897); State v. Kiewel, .supra n. 2,
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